ONE distinct disadvantage of longevity in journalism is the persistent exposure to that annoying phenomenon called the "crackdown".
Like cicadas on a summer evening, you rarely get to see an actual crackdown with the naked eye - or witness a real "tough new regime" for that matter - but you certainly hear a lot of them.
The latest crackdown to be crafted from the PR realm is a crackdown on "dark pools" and high-frequency trading.
Swashbuckling Financial Services Minister Bill Shorten sallied forth a few days ago with another probe: "An initial round of measures to put the clamps on dark pools."
Hard on the heels of the Shorten probe, the doyen of crackdowns himself, corporate regulator Greg Medcraft, declared that a taskforce had been established to execute the crackdown.
This dark-pools crackdown was akin to sending one's taskforce into war when the war is over and the mutilated bodies are being stretchered off the battlefield.
The biggest dark pool of the lot is lingering right under their noses, and that is the dark pool commonly known as the Australian Securities Exchange. At the behest of a handful of big broking houses, the ASX introduced a broker ID blackout in 2005. Until then, every share transaction had a broker ID number beside it. There has been zero transparency ever since.
To borrow from the immortal words of Eric Olthwaite, this is a dark pool so black that even the white bits are black.
Colossal arbitrages between futures, options and sharemarkets, "front-running", market manipulation - it is open slather for the big boys now.
Rivalry from the smaller brokers, their demise sped up by the digital revolution and the financial crisis, has faded. Retail punters and most ASX companies are the losers. Many punters fled for the CFD "market" or the FX "brokers", only to be finally and comprehensively ransacked.
For those who haven't had the pleasure of an acquaintance with this great demon, Dark Pools, it simply means trading things in a market that other people can't see.
The irony is that the institutional players who sometimes inhabit these demon pools outside the purview of the ASX have done so precisely to avoid having their transactions tampered with by the high-frequency traders in the ASX dark pool.
Deploying fancy software to trade by the millisecond, the incursion of these high-frequency types has snipped a bit of value from everybody.
When the ASX snuck in its broker blackout seven years ago, replete with the requisite "independent" report, which inevitably cheered it home, there was this: "Preliminary evidence suggests that an anonymous environment may not be optimal for less active non-ASX/S&P200 stocks".
This admission, sadly, was buried beneath the impenetrable "univariate analysis" of "heteroscedasticity" and the likes. The consultant, SIRCA, had earned its dough. No one read the thing. The black-out remained in the trial phase until the one journalist and two brokers whingeing about it moved on.
If the market were properly opened up for competition - clearing and settlement - the public could decide whether to opt for darkness or transparency.
IN MOST things, more transparency is better than less.
In markets, this reporter can only think of one case where this precept may be challenged, and that is in executive pay.
Here we were just last week, foolishly extolling the efficacy of the "two-strikes" regime and the new temperance in remuneration this year when, kaboom, Mike Smith just planted a bomb and made off like the Road Runner.
Thanks to the ANZ board, their chief executive was paid a cool $19.1 million last year. The spin is that the "real" number is more like $10 million and the rest was due to deferred stock, which just happened to vest during the period. But Smittie was still paid a ludicrous $14.75 million last year - so things remain "on trend".
Meanwhile, the QR National meeting came and went this week as chairman John Prescott rationalised the board's decision to ratchet up bonuses on the grounds of some changes to accounting treatments. Last year, they rewrote the rules and blamed the floods.
This year's official line was that accounting changes enhanced shareholder value. The last company we can recall using that tactic was Babcock & Brown.
One scallywag tweeted from the meeting about Prescott, "Too old, too slow", but we disagree. We in the media are desperately missing Babcock & Brown and welcome this engineering of innovative pay solutions, never canvassed in the QR prospectus.
Bring it on, we say! Let us pine for the Babcock epoch no more.
While Prescott and co managed to ramp up bonuses by extending the useful life of the group's locomotive assets, they managed to decrease the useful life of the existing board.
And the Queensland government, having claimed it would not vote its stake for exotic initiatives, did vote its stake. So it's "yes" to bigger cheques for fat cats and "yes" to public health cuts and frozen disability allowances.
Frequently Asked Questions about this Article…
What are dark pools and why should everyday investors care about them?
Dark pools are trading venues or situations where transactions happen out of public view — in short, trading that other market participants can’t see. The article explains dark pools can enable big players to exploit arbitrage, front-running and market manipulation, meaning everyday investors can lose out on fairness and price discovery when significant trading happens in the dark.
Why does the article call the ASX a ‘dark pool’ and what changed in 2005?
The article argues the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) became a kind of dark pool when it introduced a broker ID blackout in 2005. Before that every trade had a broker ID beside it; the blackout removed that transparency, which critics say let large broking houses trade with much less public scrutiny.
What is a broker ID blackout and how did it affect market transparency?
A broker ID blackout removes visible identifiers that used to show which broker executed a trade. According to the article, the ASX blackout eliminated that transparency from 2005 onward, and even a consultant report acknowledged anonymous trading may be suboptimal for less-active stocks — a warning that was largely ignored.
How do high-frequency traders (HFT) interact with dark pools and institutional orders?
The article says high-frequency traders deploy sophisticated software to trade by the millisecond and have intruded into ASX trading, eroding a bit of value for others. Institutional investors sometimes use private dark pools specifically to avoid having their orders picked off by HFT activity on public markets.
Are regulators taking action on dark pools in Australia?
Yes — the article notes recent political and regulatory attention: Federal Financial Services Minister Bill Shorten announced measures to clamp down on dark pools, and corporate regulator Greg Medcraft set up a taskforce to investigate and act on the issue.
How have dark pools and market structure changes affected retail investors and smaller brokers?
The article says rivalry from smaller brokers faded (accelerated by the digital revolution and the financial crisis) and that retail punters and many ASX-listed companies have been losers. It also mentions many retail traders fled to CFDs or FX brokers, where they also suffered heavy losses.
What executive pay examples does the article highlight and why does it matter to shareholders?
The article highlights ANZ’s chief executive Mike Smith, reporting a $19.1 million pay figure (with commentary that a ‘real’ number might be lower due to deferred stock) and noting a still-large $14.75 million payout in another year. The piece uses this to question transparency and the effectiveness of measures like the two-strikes regime, arguing big executive pay remains a shareholder issue.
What happened at the QR National meeting about bonuses and accounting changes?
At the QR National meeting the board justified higher bonuses by pointing to accounting changes — for example, extending the useful life of locomotive assets — and the Queensland government (despite earlier promises) voted its stake in favour. The article compares this type of accounting-driven reward to tactics used by Babcock & Brown in the past.