HAMAS gives away little about the living, but in death there are nods of agreement that Ahmad al-Jabari was the military strategist who made an army with a serious arsenal out of a militia once armed with home-made rockets that some Israeli analysts dismissed as "flying stovepipes".
Much of the detail on the 51-year-old Jabari's success in rebuilding Hamas' military wing - the Ezzedine al-Qassam Brigades - is revealed by Israeli security sources who, as was proved by the targeting information they had for the strike on Jabari, still run a formidable informer network in Gaza.
The most sophisticated weapon known to be in the Hamas munitions bunkers, reportedly acquired this year, is the Iranian Fajr-5 rocket, which carries a 90-kilogram warhead and has a range of more than 70 kilometres - putting Tel Aviv and Jerusalem in striking distance.
Israel estimates that Hamas had about 100 Fajr-5s, but claims to have destroyed many of them in the past week.
Unnamed Israeli security figures told The New York Times that trained crews used underground pads to launch the rockets, which were hauled from Iran to Sudan and then to Egypt, where they were broken into parts, which were then smuggled into Gaza by tunnel.
"The smuggling route involves salaried employees from Hamas along the way, Iranian technical experts travelling on forged passports and government approval in Sudan," the report said, giving credence to the widely held belief that an air strike on a Sudanese munitions factory at the end of October was an Israeli bid to halt the supply chain.
The Fajr-5 is a quantum leap from the early missiles Jabari's Gaza workshops produced in 2001. Called the Qassam-1, they flew erratically for just four kilometres, carrying a very small warhead. By 2005, the Qassam had evolved to a range of 12 kilometres and a warhead of 15 kilograms but still rated poorly as a targeted weapon.
In 2008 Hamas reportedly acquired its first foreign-made rockets the Grad from Iran and Libya and, in time, produced locally (with a range of almost 20 kilometres and a 18-kilogram warhead) and the WS-1E from China (45-kilometre range and 22-kilogram warhead).
The Grad stocks reportedly are in the hundreds the Qassams in the thousands.
The Israeli sources claimed Jabari was also producing drones he intended to fly in Israeli airspace just as Israeli unmanned aircraft constantly patrol the skies of Gaza.
It was the Hamas strongman's role in the Gilad Shalit hostage negotiations that provoked one of the more intriguing Israeli responses to his death, by Gershon Baskin, a columnist for The Jerusalem Post, who initiated the secret channel through which the soldier's release was negotiated.
"I believe that Israel made a grave and irresponsible strategic error by deciding to kill Mr Jabari," Baskin wrote in The New York Times .
His point was not that Jabari was a man of peace. But in the prisoner exchange negotiations, Baskin concluded that Jabari was interested in a long-term ceasefire and that it was Jabari who had been responsible for enforcing previous ceasefire agreements - to the extent that they had held.
Baskin concluded: "This was not inevitable, and cooler heads could have prevailed. Mr Jabari's assassination removes one of the more practical actors on the Hamas side."
Frequently Asked Questions about this Article…
Who was Ahmad al-Jabari and why was he considered important?
Ahmad al-Jabari was the 51-year-old military strategist who rebuilt Hamas's Ezzedine al-Qassam Brigades, turning a militia that once used homemade rockets into a force with a much more serious arsenal and the ability to enforce deals such as ceasefires.
What kinds of rockets and weapons did Hamas develop or acquire under Jabari's leadership?
Under Jabari, Hamas evolved from homemade Qassam rockets to acquiring and producing longer-range weapons including Iranian Fajr-5 rockets (90 kg warhead, range >70 km), Grad rockets (hundreds in stock), and Chinese WS-1E systems (about 45 km range), as well as locally produced Grad-type and improved Qassam variants.
How many Fajr-5 rockets did Israel estimate Hamas possessed and what happened to them?
Israeli estimates put Hamas's Fajr-5 stocks at about 100, and Israeli authorities said they had destroyed many of those rockets in the week before the article was published.
How were sophisticated rockets like the Fajr-5 smuggled into Gaza?
According to Israeli security sources, Fajr-5 rockets were moved from Iran to Sudan, then to Egypt where they were broken into parts and smuggled through tunnels into Gaza, using salaried Hamas operatives, allegedly forged passports for technical experts, and reported government approval in Sudan.
Did Hamas also develop drones, and what was their intended use?
Israeli sources cited in the article claimed Jabari was producing drones intended to fly into Israeli airspace, adding another dimension to Hamas's capabilities beyond rockets.
What was Jabari's role in hostage negotiations and ceasefire enforcement?
Jabari played a central role in the Gilad Shalit hostage negotiations and, according to commentator Gershon Baskin, was a practical actor interested in a long-term ceasefire who had been responsible for enforcing prior ceasefire agreements to the extent they held.
How did Hamas's rocket capability evolve from the early Qassam rockets to later systems?
Early Qassam-1 rockets in 2001 flew erratically about 4 km with tiny warheads; by 2005 Qassams reached roughly 12 km with ~15 kg warheads. By 2008 Hamas began acquiring foreign-made Grads and later WS-1E systems, extending ranges to around 20–45 km and increasing warhead sizes significantly.
What strategic reaction did analysts note after Jabari's assassination?
Some commentators, notably Gershon Baskin, argued that killing Jabari was a grave strategic error because it removed one of the more practical Hamas actors who had been involved in negotiating and enforcing ceasefires, potentially changing the dynamics of future negotiations.
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