Intelligence deficit disorder

Stratfor.com
As Stratfor has argued, inaction in the face of the Mumbai attack of November 26 is probably not an option for the Indian government. However, India also is not interested in a full-scale war with Pakistan or the collapse of the Pakistani government.

Islamabad has given indications that, despite institutional links, those responsible for the November 26 attacks were not acting under the direction of the upper echelons of the Pakistani government. New Delhi hopes to pressure Islamabad to do what it so far has been unable or unwilling to do — namely, rein in rogue elements of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the militant groups operating in Pakistan.

To do so, India must demonstrate its resolve — including its military resolve — to show Pakistan that New Delhi will take increasingly overt measures to crush these groups if Islamabad does not establish control over its own government and territory. Such a response could take three basic forms, consisting of a confrontation on the ground, airborne strikes and/or a naval blockade.

One of India's military options involves ground troops backed by heavy fire support. These forces could attempt to push into Pakistani-controlled Kashmir in the north to engage Pakistani militant groups directly. Though the November 26 operation was complex and likely included a home-grown jihadist element, indications increasingly suggest that the principal actors in the attacks probably are linked to militant proxies of the ISI that have become gradually more autonomous and drifted closer to elements of al Qaeda and rogue ISI operatives.

Already shadowy organisations, these groups most likely have hunkered down in anticipation of military and intelligence collection efforts by India. Though amorphous and diffuse, they operate largely in Pakistani-administered Kashmir, a long-contested territory made up of extremely rough terrain. Paramilitary forces patrol both sides of the border, an area for which both Islamabad and New Delhi keep war plans.

The Indian military is trained and equipped for this task. It has military and paramilitary units that train in mountain warfare and are acclimatised to the terrain (as Israel learned in Lebanon in 2006, this is a job for troops on the ground rather than aircraft). But the terrain is rugged and favours the defence. In the case of Kashmir, Pakistan's defensive positions will have been chosen with care and are likely to be deeply entrenched and prepared. Soldiers and paramilitary forces along the border will be on high alert.

Another Indian option, special operations forces, would be better suited to infiltrating past these positions. But their effective employment is much more heavily reliant on pinpoint intelligence. The planning process would thus likely be much more drawn out while specific targets were identified and prioritised and logistics were arranged, likely taking more time than the political circumstances would favour. This is not India's usual means of proceeding, and there is no real precedent for it in the two countries' history of conflict.

Even without troops, Indian and Pakistani positions trading artillery fire across the border is hardly uncommon in the region, especially along the 1972 Line of Control (LoC). Just last July, India complained of Pakistani shelling during a border skirmish. More serious exchanges of artillery took place back in 2003. Though artillery fire can reach miles beyond the border — indeed, India's Russian BM-30 batteries fire 300 mm rockets up to 55 miles — it is not clear that any of these systems are currently deployed in Kashmir. But while the Indians are in a position to rain down artillery fire on positions well beyond the LoC without ever leaving their own deeply entrenched and carefully selected positions, the problem of target selection is compounded by the need to have eyes on the target to adjust fire.

New Delhi could also go the route of missile and airstrikes. India's ballistic missile arsenal, which can reach all of Pakistan, also could be used. Some of India's missiles are thought to be reasonably accurate for this purpose and could be fitted with high explosive rather than with nuclear warheads. India's newest and most accurate missiles are undoubtedly dedicated to its strategic deterrent, however. Such a strategy would also run the risk of being interpreted as a volley of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles — a misunderstanding New Delhi would want to avoid.

Less risky would be the use of land-based BrahMos cruise missiles. New to the Indian arsenal, they are supersonic and could likely penetrate Pakistani airspace. This would be the missiles' first operational use, however, and their accuracy remains to be seen. For both the ballistic and cruise missile options, the problem of targeting remains.

Airstrikes are less likely to be misinterpreted, and these could reach deep into Pakistan. Though Pakistan has acquired some radar in recent years, its underlying surface-to-air missile arsenal (as distinct from Pakistan's more robust indigenous surface-to-surface ballistic missile arsenal) is aging, and much of it is of very limited range. It is not clear how well-integrated Pakistan's air defence network is, either. Of note are recent acquisitions of a nascent airborne early warning capability.

India has late-model Russian-built Su-30MKI "Flanker” fighter jets positioned in striking distance of Pakistan, and their pilots have been increasingly well-regarded by US pilots at Red Flag exercises in Nevada. Competently operated, these are considered some of the best combat aircraft in the world and will probably fare well against Pakistan's older F-16s.

Some of the Indian air force's aircraft also reportedly have been outfitted with Israeli radar and electronic warfare subsystems. The Indian air force thus probably has the tools and capability to penetrate the Pakistani air defence network, though it would likely demand a large effort, requiring significant coordination of the suppression of enemy air defences, combat air patrols and electronic warfare efforts, as well as of the strike itself.

But the challenge, again, is targeting. The likely militant targets in Pakistani-administered Kashmir are not easily struck meaningfully from the air without exceptional intelligence. Even with the best intelligence, India does not field a wide variety of the latest generation of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) that would allow it to accurately engage those targets that can be identified. Targeting fixed positions directly representative of the Pakistani government, such as the ISI headquarters in downtown Islamabad, is also problematic.

Hitting them would represent a much more forceful and direct strike against the Pakistani state itself — a strike that Islamabad might feel forced to respond to. Just as important, the portions of the Pakistani government that have been most deeply penetrated and compromised largely have been compromised at the fringes of their operations, not at headquarters.

India does reportedly have some PGMs in its inventory, possibly of Israeli and Russian origin. There is no indication, however, that India has more than an extremely limited supply of earlier-generation PGMs. Indeed, perhaps more important is India's lack of experience in employing the PGMs operationally.

Strikes, potentially up to and including Islamabad, would likely entail much more ordnance than many have come to expect in the day of exceptionally precise strikes being carried out by Hellfire missiles and GPS-guided bombs. Collateral damage could be high, possibly pressuring Pakistan into more aggressive action than it would prefer.

A final option for India is a naval blockade of the Pakistani coast. India did just this in 1971 (with meaningful results in terms of disrupting the Pakistani economy) and reportedly considered it in 2001 after the Indian Parliament was bombed. The Indian navy is thus not unfamiliar with the mission, and it is now capable of bringing to bear naval force supported with both carrier-based and land-based aviation.

Nevertheless, although Mumbai was infiltrated by boat, this approach does nothing to address the Kashmiri militant groups thought to be the likely culprits of the Mumbai attack. The issue is further complicated by the heavy US and NATO reliance on the Pakistani port of Karachi to support operations in Afghanistan.

These various avenues of attack are hardly mutually exclusive. However, air, artillery or cruise missile strikes — as well as a blockade — alone run the risk of being interpreted as symbolic shows of force, unconvincing to either Islamabad or the Indian people. Stratfor has pointed out that the potential for very real and very fast escalation is also possible. We cannot yet say what course India will choose, but we still view some manner of Indian military action against Pakistan as likely.

Stratfor provides intelligence services for individuals, global corporations, and divisions of the US and foreign governments around the world.