China must curb investment addiction
China's economy slowed unexpectedly in the second quarter of this year. Just as unexpectedly, most data released since July suggests China's growth has stabilised. Markets, not surprisingly, have breathed a collective sigh of relief. But should investors still be nervous?
The most severe problem confronting Chinese authorities is overcapacity. For example, China's annual production capacity for crude steel is 1 billion tonnes, but its total output in 2012 was 720 million tonnes - a capacity utilisation rate of 72 per cent. More strikingly, the steel industry's profitability was just 0.04 per cent in 2012. Indeed, the profit on two tonnes of steel was just about enough to buy a lollipop. So far this year, the average profitability of China's top 500 companies is 4.34 per cent, down 33 basis points from 2012.
Some say that today's overcapacity is a result of China's past overinvestment. Others attribute it to a lack of effective demand. The government seems to come down in the middle. On one hand, the authorities have ordered thousands of companies to reduce capacity. On the other, it has introduced some "mini-stimulus" measures, ranging from exemptions for "micro firms", from business and sales taxes to pressure banks to increase loans to exporters.
The official line is China's growth model requires less investment and more consumption. But not all Chinese economists agree. They argue capital stock is the key factor for growth and China's per capita capital stock is still low relative to developed countries, which implies considerable scope for further investment.
To be sure, capital accumulation is a driving force of economic growth, and catching up with developed-country income levels implies that China must increase its capital stock in the long run. But what is at issue is not the size of the capital stock, or even the level of investment; the problem is the growth rate of investment, which has been significantly higher than that of GDP for decades.
According to official statistics, China's investment rate is approaching 50 per cent of GDP. Given absorption constraints, capital efficiency has been falling steadily amid increasing deadweight. If environmental damage caused by breakneck investment growth were taken into account, China's capital efficiency would be even lower.
Human capital and technological progress are as important to economic growth as physical capital and labour, if not more so. If resource allocation is skewed towards physical capital at the expense of accumulating human capital - for which adequate consumption is indispensable - economic growth would be more likely to slow than rise. So China should reduce the growth rate of investment and increase that of consumption, allowing the investment rate to settle at a more sustainable level. Of course, it is not entirely untrue that China's overcapacity reflects a shortfall of effective demand. But where can effective demand come from?
Again, China's steel industry provides a telling example. Despite China's lack of a comparative advantage for steel production, it has built about 1000 mills, with output accounting for roughly half of the global total. As early as 2004, China's government tried to clamp down on overinvestment; and yet output increased dramatically, from 300 million tonnes that year to a billion tonnes in 2012, owing to strong demand generated by investment in infrastructure and real estate development.
China's investment consists of mainly three broad categories: manufacturing industry, infrastructure and real estate. In late 2008 and 2009, at the height of the global financial crisis, stimulus-fuelled infrastructure investment sustained output growth. In 2010, investment in real estate development replaced infrastructure investment as the main driver of growth. Today, both are important drivers of China's growth.
China does need more infrastructure investment - particularly in power and water utilities, transport and communications. But the pace of investment must take financial constraints fully into consideration. More important, China can and should invest more in social infrastructure such as schools, hospitals, retirement homes, and so on.
However, real estate investment is another story. It is difficult to judge how serious China's property bubble is and when it might burst. But one thing is certain: China has invested too much in real estate development.
With per capita income at less than $US6000, home ownership in China is roughly 90 per cent, compared with less than 70 per cent in the US. Average floor space per capita is 32.9 square metres, while median floor space per family in Hong Kong is just 48 square metres. China has 696 five-star hotels, with another 500 on the way. Five of the 10 tallest skyscrapers under construction worldwide are in China. In my view, this is madness.
China's economy is being held hostage by real estate investment. On one hand, China should not try to eliminate overcapacity by maintaining the high growth rate of real estate investment. While investment in social housing should be welcomed, real estate investment, running at 10-13 per cent of GDP, is already far too high.
On the other hand, if real estate investment growth falls, overcapacity will be difficult to eliminate. This dilemma highlights the structural-adjustment challenge that China faces - and should give investors reason to hold their breath.
That said, there are two caveats. First, unlike other categories of investment, real estate investment does not increase productive capital stock. There is no fundamental difference between a house and an expensive durable consumer good. Second, in China's statistics, the growth rate of gross fixed-asset investment is much higher than that of gross capital formation. This indicates that data on the growth rate of fixed-asset investment may have exaggerated the pace of capital-stock accumulation.
Hence, while the Chinese government should be firm on reducing the dependence of growth on investment, it must exercise utmost care when doing so.
Yu Yongding is former president of the China Society of World Economics and director of the Institute of World Economics and Politics at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.
Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2013.
Frequently Asked Questions about this Article…
China’s overcapacity means it has built far more production ability than it uses. A clear example: annual crude steel capacity is about 1 billion tonnes while 2012 output was 720 million tonnes (72% utilisation), and steel profitability was almost zero that year. Overcapacity depresses profits, ties up capital in low-return assets and can weigh on commodity prices and sectors tied to heavy industry — all of which can affect investors with exposure to China or global commodity and industrial markets.
After an unexpected slowdown in the second quarter, most data since July suggest China’s growth has stabilised. Policymakers say the model should shift toward less investment and more consumption. However, investment growth has long outpaced GDP growth and China’s investment rate is approaching 50% of GDP, which raises concerns about falling capital efficiency and increasing deadweight investment — issues investors should monitor when assessing China exposure.
Real estate has been a major growth driver and accounts for a very large share of investment (running around 10–13% of GDP). China has high home ownership (roughly 90%) despite relatively low per‑capita income, substantial floor space per person, many new hotels and skyscrapers. The article warns China has likely invested too much in property, that real estate doesn’t increase productive capital like manufacturing does, and that the property sector’s adjustment poses a dilemma for policymakers — a risk investors should take seriously.
The article stresses that long‑term growth requires not just physical capital but human capital and technological progress. If resources remain skewed toward physical investment at the expense of human capital and adequate consumption, future growth could slow. For investors, a successful shift toward consumption and social investment (schools, hospitals, retirement homes) would create different winners — consumer goods, services and social infrastructure — compared with heavy industry and property.
Authorities have ordered thousands of firms to cut capacity while also rolling out small stimulus measures to support micro firms (tax exemptions) and encouraging banks to lend more to exporters. Investors should watch announcements about capacity cuts, targeted stimulus measures, lending policies and any signals that the government is balancing cuts in investment with steps to support demand.
An investment rate that high, according to the article, runs into absorption constraints: adding more capital yields diminishing returns, so overall capital efficiency falls and more investment becomes deadweight. If environmental costs were fully counted, efficiency would be even lower. For investors, this suggests lower average returns in sectors driven by excessive investment growth and higher risk of underperforming assets.
The article cautions that some headline investment statistics can be misleading. For example, the growth rate of gross fixed‑asset investment is often much higher than the growth rate of gross capital formation, which implies fixed‑asset figures may exaggerate how fast capital stock is actually accumulating. Investors should treat headline investment growth with care and look for supporting indicators like capacity utilisation and profitability.
Keep a balanced, diversified approach: be cautious about concentrated exposure to Chinese heavy industry and property sectors; monitor policy signals on capacity cuts and demand support; consider opportunities in areas aligned with rising consumption and social infrastructure (education, healthcare, utilities); and watch hard data — capacity utilisation, corporate profitability and lending trends — rather than relying solely on headline GDP or fixed‑asset investment growth figures.
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