The MF Global collapse says a lot about a system that lets customers' money disappear so easily.
THE New York Post whipped up a mild frenzy this week by reporting that the Occupy Wall Street movement had plans to stay camped out in Zuccotti Park in downtown Manhattan until 2025. It had found an online calendar on the Occupy website which had "Radical Economics 101" scheduled for 10am on Sunday, October 26, 2025. The notion that the movement would still be teaching the class 14 years after the campaign started should have been enough to ring alarm bells for the newspaper. However, the downfall of futures and derivatives trading house MF Global, the seventh-largest bankruptcy in US history according to Reuters data, may be giving protesters reason to consider laying down some roots.
How MF Global managed to crash and burn in a short-term financing debacle the likes of which brought Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns to their knees only a few years ago is worth looking at.
Moreover, how MF Global is still unable to locate $US633 million ($A615 million) of clients' money almost two weeks after it filed for bankruptcy is the most troubling indictment on the firm and says a lot about a system that allows customers' money to disappear so easily. MF Global was spun out of Man Financial in 2007. It spent most of its life as a commodity broking house, executing investments on behalf of clients and betting on the future price of everything from stocks to debt. The shares in MF Global, however, had been declining since 2008. Enter Jon Corzine in March last year.
The former chief executive of Wall Street giant Goldman Sachs and New Jersey governor shocked many in the investment community when he agreed to return to Wall Street to revive the fortunes of the company.
But the rock-star reception the Democrat received ended last Friday when he resigned his position, four days after MF Global declared bankruptcy. He was rightly taking the fall for a $US6.3 billion bet he and the board of MF Global authorised when they invested in the sovereign debt of Belgium, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Basically, MF Global was banking on Europe being able to dig itself out of its debt crisis a white knuckle gamble. When customers invest in companies such as MF Global their money is supposed to be kept in a "segregated account" separate to the firm's money.
It appears MF Global was driven to use customer assets to provide liquidity and stave off cash demands from counterparties of its investments in the days before its demise.
When ratings agencies downgraded the investment quality of the firm, spooked by the large European debt exposure and a 30-1 leveraging ratio against those bets, there was an understandable "run" on the firm as large clients rushed to pull their money out.
Now, as MF Global wallows in bankruptcy proceedings, there are about 150,000 clients who have been locked out of their accounts. These customers face long delays in accessing their money if it is still there.
There is about $US1 billion in collateral in these clients' accounts that has not been released. This is money that should never have been used for, or by, anyone else.
But the way these investments are structured is to provide high returns based on high risk. The commission structure also gives fund managers incentive to bet big with your money. What bigger bet than expecting the European debt crisis to sort itself out?
Corzine himself stands condemned for his efforts over the past year to stall reforms designed by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission to stop firms from essentially borrowing money from their own customers for these sorts of trades. Questions also have to be levelled at the seven-member board of MF Global. There are two former senior executives from HSBC, a top member of the private equity firm J. C. Flowers & Company and the former chief financial officer of the Aon Corporation. Fellow director Robert Sloan is even a managing partner in a company that specialises in the sort of financing and counterparty risk management that saw MF Global come unstuck.
How were directors left feeling comfortable with a $US6.3 billion bet on European sovereign debt?
Trustee James Giddens, of bankruptcy specialists Hughes Hubbard & Reed, has won court permission to probe the company's directors, as well as investors. Other regulators including the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commission are also investigating, as is the FBI. Let's hope they get some answers including whether MF Global exploited customers' segregated accounts and if so why. If so, how was it able to use the funds to stem off its impending insolvency?
While the Dodd-Frank financial reforms, forged out of the global financial crisis, are yet to take full effect, it is unlikely they would have prevented the MF Global collapse.
Perhaps it is time for the second wave of legislative reform and a full assessment of whether the Investment Company Act of 1940, which requires extensive disclosure and independently audited financial statements for these sorts of publicly traded funds, adequately protects mum and dad investors.
At the very least it is time to get our lesson books out and revise the notes we made back in 2008. Investments offering high returns are by their nature high risk.
How much responsibility directors, effectively part-time members of a company, are expected to take for investments should also be examined. Can someone not living and breathing the day-to-day running of a company confidently approve billions of dollars of investment? If boards are to carry this responsibility then there also needs to be greater accountability when things go wrong.
MF Global is said to be the first corporate corpse attributable to the European debt crisis. If more follow it will be hard to ignore the need for a second round of reform.
A crisis is a terrible thing to waste. Particularly a second time.
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Frequently Asked Questions about this Article…
What caused the MF Global collapse and how did it happen?
MF Global’s collapse followed a huge $US6.3 billion bet on European sovereign debt combined with heavy leverage (about 30:1). Ratings downgrades and concerns about its European exposure triggered a run as large clients pulled funds, creating severe short-term financing pressure that the firm couldn’t withstand.
How much client money is reported missing or locked up at MF Global?
The article reports about $US633 million of clients’ money could not be located shortly after the bankruptcy, and roughly $US1 billion in collateral in client accounts had not been released. Around 150,000 clients were locked out of their accounts during the bankruptcy process.
Did MF Global use client segregated accounts to cover its own obligations?
The article says it appears MF Global used customer assets to provide liquidity and meet cash demands in the run-up to its collapse. Regulators and the bankruptcy trustee are probing whether segregated client accounts were exploited and, if so, how that was done.
What role did Jon Corzine play in the MF Global failure?
Jon Corzine, former Goldman Sachs CEO and ex-New Jersey governor, returned as MF Global CEO and was associated with the $US6.3 billion European debt positions. He resigned shortly after the firm filed for bankruptcy, and the article criticises his past efforts to stall regulatory reforms designed to stop firms borrowing from customers.
Who is investigating MF Global and its directors?
The bankruptcy trustee James Giddens (Hughes Hubbard & Reed) has court permission to probe the company’s directors and investors. Other investigations mentioned include the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the FBI.
Would Dodd‑Frank reforms have prevented the MF Global collapse?
According to the article, while Dodd‑Frank reforms are not yet fully in effect, it is unlikely they would have prevented the MF Global collapse. The piece suggests a potential second wave of legislative reform and a re‑assessment of disclosure rules like those in the Investment Company Act of 1940.
What lessons should everyday investors take from the MF Global case?
Key takeaways are that investments promising high returns are typically high risk, commission structures can incentivise big bets by fund managers, and investors should pay attention to disclosure, independent audits and how client funds are held. The article urges revisiting the lessons from the 2008 crisis and being cautious with complex, highly leveraged products.
Should investors worry about board oversight and director accountability after MF Global?
Yes. The article highlights questions about how a seven‑member board approved such large bets, noting several directors had ties to financial firms. It argues boards need clearer accountability if they are to approve billions in investments without being involved in day‑to‑day operations.