Why the US just might cross the line of 'extreme idiocy'
That's what Vincent Reinhart, former head of the Federal Reserve's monetary division and now managing director of Morgan Stanley, said late last week.
"As political theatre," he said, "the debt ceiling is not a useful threat, because politicians are basically threatening to shoot themselves, as they will rightly shoulder the blame for the serious global economic consequences of a default."
Reinhart's view has become conventional wisdom on Wall Street when it comes to whether the country will hit the debt ceiling limit on October 17. Warren Buffett put it this way: "We'll go right up to the point of extreme idiocy, but we won't cross it."
Nobody believes the country will actually exceed the debt limit, which is exactly why it might. Oddly enough, despite all the predictions of panic, the sharemarket was down only marginally over the past couple of sessions.
Here's the perversity of Wall Street's psychology: The more Wall Street is convinced that Washington will act rationally and raise the debt ceiling, most likely at the 11th hour, the less pressure there will be on politicians to reach an agreement. That will make it more likely a deal isn't reached.
John Podesta, a former chief of staff for President Bill Clinton, said that while only weeks ago he believed it was almost impossible that Congress wouldn't reach a deal, he now wonders whether it will be reached in time.
What happens when the government exceeds the debt limit? It is often forgotten, but it actually did default once, in 1979 - by accident.
Here's a history lesson from Donald Marron of the Tax Policy Centre. He wrote on his blog in 2011 - the last time this game of chicken was taking place - that Congress raised the debt ceiling at the 11th hour in 1979 but the government "defaulted because Treasury's back office was on the fritz". He explained that the government ultimately paid the debt back in full.
So, what happened to interest rates?
"T-bill rates rose almost 0.6 percentage points. There's no indication this increase reversed in the days that followed."
That may sound like a lot - and it is - but let's put that in context: "T-bill rates hover near zero compared to the 9-10 per cent range of the late 1970s; that means a temporary delay in payments would be less costly for creditors."
Of course, for the past several weeks we have heard ad nauseam how imperative it is for Congress to raise the debt ceiling or put at risk the creditworthiness of the US. Even approaching the deadline without a resolution was supposed to send the market into a panic and interest rates skyrocketing.
And yet here we are, about a week before the deadline, and the market hasn't cratered despite remarks over the weekend by House Speaker John Boehner, who indicated, for the first time, that he planned to use the debt ceiling as a negotiating chip in seeking concessions from President Barack Obama, who has steadfastly refused to negotiate.
Almost bizarrely, the market's reaction - or lack of one in this case - may actually contribute to an outcome everyone has been railing against.
The ruinous potential for a default has had Wall Street leaders screaming from the rooftops: "Whatever circumstances and disagreements got us to this current unhappy juncture, there is no way that our government leaders can allow the full faith and credit of the United States of America to be jeopardised. This is an issue that affects every single citizen," Morgan Stanley chief executive James Gorman wrote in an email to his employees, urging them to contact their representatives in Washington.
For some market participants, the prospect of reaching the debt limit isn't worrisome, not because they don't think a deal will be reached but because they believe that the October 17 deadline is either fake - they speculate that Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew has built in some wriggle room to force a decision - or that the government will ultimately be able to prioritise certain payments over others so that it can continue to pay its debts and Social Security payments.
A year ago, Stanley Druckenmiller, the hedge fund manager, told The Wall Street Journal: "I think technical default would be horrible, but I don't think it's going to be the end of the world. It's not going to be catastrophic."
Frequently Asked Questions about this Article…
The debt ceiling is a legally set limit on how much the US government can borrow. The article highlights an October 17 deadline when politicians must act to avoid hitting that limit. Investors watch this date closely because political deadlock over raising the ceiling could force the Treasury to delay payments, create market uncertainty and push up short-term borrowing costs.
Most market participants quoted in the article believe an outright long-term default is unlikely — a view summed up by Vincent Reinhart and echoed by Warren Buffett’s comment that the US will “go right up to the point of extreme idiocy, but we won’t cross it.” However, the article also warns that political theatre and complacency could increase the chance of a temporary or technical default.
The article points to the 1979 episode when a technical default coincided with T‑bill rates rising by almost 0.6 percentage points. While that was significant then, current short-term rates are much lower, so any temporary delay in payments might be less costly for creditors than in the late 1970s — but it could still push short-term yields higher and disrupt money markets.
According to the article, equities have only fallen marginally because many on Wall Street assume Congress will eventually act to avert a full-blown default. That confidence reduces immediate market panic, but the article notes a paradox: the more markets believe a last‑minute deal is certain, the less political pressure exists to reach one, which could actually increase the odds of a standoff.
In 1979 the US effectively defaulted by accident when Treasury’s back office malfunctioned; the government repaid the obligations in full. T‑bill rates rose about 0.6 percentage points and did not immediately reverse. The takeaways are that operational or timing issues can cause a temporary default and that such events can push short-term interest rates higher even if debts are ultimately paid.
The article reports market speculation that Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew might have some flexibility or “wriggle room” to prioritise certain payments (for example, interest and Social Security) if the limit is hit. That idea has been suggested by some market participants but remains speculative and is not presented as a guaranteed solution.
Senior executives such as Morgan Stanley’s James Gorman have warned strongly that the full faith and credit of the US must not be jeopardised, urging action from policymakers. For everyday investors the article implies this is a signal to monitor political developments closely, be aware of potential short‑term market volatility around the deadline, and avoid assuming policymakers will automatically prevent every risk.
The article cites hedge‑fund manager Stanley Druckenmiller saying a technical default would be “horrible” but probably not the end of the world or catastrophic. Historical evidence (1979) and some market commentary suggest a technical default would raise short‑term costs and cause volatility, but not necessarily trigger a total market collapse — though outcomes depend on the duration and severity of any disruption.
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