The budget facts that Canberra isn't telling you
So let me be the adult and tell you what Chris Bowen and Joe Hockey should be telling you, but aren't: the more anxious we become about the economy losing speed before we make the transition to non-mining-led growth, the less urgent it becomes to get the budget back to surplus.
You'd never know it when you think of how furiously the two sides have been squabbling over "debt and deficits" for the past four years, but Labor and the Liberals have a bipartisan fiscal policy. Both sides have essentially the same "medium-term fiscal strategy": to achieve budget balance on average over the medium term.
Everything I say here is consistent with that strategy - meaning much of what Bowen and Hockey say on the topic is inconsistent with it.
That clever strategy needs a lot of unpacking for non-economists. Because budget balance (or, in Labor's formulation, surplus) needs to be achieved only on average over a period of, say, a decade, it's saying there's nothing inevitably bad about deficits or inevitably good about surpluses.
So there'll be times when deficits are appropriate and times when surpluses are. Which is which? Deficits are appropriate when the economy is growing well below its medium-term "trend" rate of about 3 per cent a year; surpluses are appropriate when the economy is growing near, at or above trend.
Stick to that approach and, in the end, the deficits and surpluses will cancel each other out, leaving no lasting debt burden to be borne by our "children and grandchildren".
The next bit to be unpacked - which non-economists seem incapable of keeping in their heads for longer than five minutes - is that the process of the budget dropping into deficit when the economy is weak, then climbing back to surplus when the economy strengthens, happens automatically without the government raising a finger.
This is because of the operation of the budget's built-in "automatic stabilisers" which, when the economy is weak, cause tax collections to fall and welfare spending to grow and, when the economy is strong, go into reverse and cause tax collections to boom and welfare spending to fall.
So provided the government of the day doesn't make changes of its own volition that work in the opposite direction to the stabilisers, they can be relied on to leave the budget balance just where it ought to be as the economy moves through the business cycle.
The strategy doesn't prevent the government from adding its own "fiscal stimulus" at times when the economy is particularly weak, just as long as that stimulus is temporary.
As for other spending or taxing measures taken by the government, they need to be fully funded (by offsetting spending cuts or tax increases) if the operation of the automatic stabilisers is to ensure we end up with no lasting debt as a result of annual deficits exceeding annual surpluses.
All of this stands in stark contrast to the opposition's populist, economically illiterate line that deficits and debt are always a bad thing, always proof of economic mismanagement and (see above) always the result of things the government chose to do rather than things the state of the economy did to the budget (via the automatic stabilisers).
In his major speech this week, Bowen noted that the great challenge facing the economy over the next year or two is "rebalancing" - making the transition from growth led by the mining investment boom to growth led by the rest of the economy.
The question, he said, is whether the transition will be "smooth or bumpy". Bang on. That's exactly the question worrying the econocrats behind the scenes. Maybe it will be smooth, but maybe it won't. We know that, already, the economy is growing well below trend, causing unemployment to drift up.
Should it slow down much further, the rise in unemployment would quicken and become more worrying. And should mining investment fall off rapidly, before the acceleration in home building and non-mining business investment got going, it's conceivable the economy could slow to the point of contraction.
Trouble is, Bowen in his speech misdiagnosed the problem. He said the answer was Kevin Rudd's seven-point plan to get productivity improvement back up to 2 per cent a year.
Wrong. This confuses micro-economic policy (aimed at raising the medium-term trend rate of growth) with macro-economic policy (aimed at keeping the actual rate of growth as close as possible to the existing trend rate, thereby smoothing the business cycle). The point is that our main instrument of macro management, monetary policy (the manipulation of interest rates by the Reserve Bank), may not be enough to ensure we avoid a serious downturn. It may prove necessary to use fiscal policy as an emergency back-up.
If the economy suddenly slowed in a way that threatened to seriously shake business and consumer confidence and start a self-perpetuating downward spiral in private sector spending, the answer would be to step in quickly with a confidence-boosting "cash splash". We know from the global financial crisis how remarkably effective such measures can be.
Should that opportunity be missed, the next response would be to be ready with well-advanced plans for a program of heavy infrastructure spending to fill the vacuum left by the retreating mining investment boom. Even now the budget's growth forecasts are looking unachievable. If Bowen had any sense, he'd be toning down the rhetoric about getting the budget back to surplus in 2016-17 and making the point I began with.
If Hockey has any sense, he'll back off from the nonsense about debt and deficits, just in case he has the good fortune to inherit Bowen's problem.
Frequently Asked Questions about this Article…
The medium-term fiscal strategy described in the article is to achieve budget balance on average over the medium term (for example, over a decade). For investors this matters because it means occasional deficits aren’t automatically bad and occasional surpluses aren’t automatically good — the aim is to smooth outcomes over the business cycle so the budget doesn’t create a lasting debt burden for future generations.
Deficits can be appropriate when the economy is growing well below its medium-term trend (around 3% a year in the article). That’s because automatic stabilisers — falling tax receipts and higher welfare spending when growth is weak — naturally widen deficits. The article argues that these cyclical deficits are not evidence of mismanagement if they help stabilise the economy.
Automatic stabilisers are built‑in budget mechanisms like tax collections and welfare payments that move counter‑cyclically: when the economy weakens, tax revenue falls and welfare spending rises, widening deficits; when the economy strengthens, the reverse happens and the budget moves toward surplus. For investors, they mean part of budget movement is automatic and linked to the business cycle rather than discretionary policy.
According to the article, fiscal stimulus should be used as an emergency back‑up if the economy slows sharply and risks a self‑perpetuating downturn that monetary policy alone can’t handle. A quick confidence‑boosting cash payment or well‑advanced plans for heavy infrastructure spending can be effective to fill the gap left by falling investment, particularly from the mining sector.
Fiscal policy (macro policy) is about smoothing the economy over the business cycle — using spending and taxes to keep actual growth close to trend. Microeconomic reforms aim to raise the medium‑term trend rate of growth (productivity improvements). The article warns these are different tools and that short‑term smoothing may require fiscal action while micro reforms take longer to lift trend growth.
The article highlights a rebalancing risk: if mining investment falls faster than home building and non‑mining business investment accelerates, the economy could slow further or even contract. That would push unemployment higher and could hurt corporate earnings and market confidence, so investors should watch indicators of investment and unemployment during the transition.
The article suggests the Reserve Bank (monetary policy via interest rates) is the main macro tool, but it may not be enough if a sharp slowdown threatens confidence. In that case, fiscal policy should be ready as a back‑up — quick temporary stimulus or infrastructure programs — to prevent a deeper downturn.
The article argues politicians should be cautious about firm surplus promises (for example, the 2016–17 claim mentioned). Because the budget naturally cycles with the economy, promising a fixed surplus date can be misleading if growth rebalances or weakens. A more sensible approach is to be ready to use temporary fiscal measures if the economy needs support.

