Media groups must face the common enemy
While Seven's Tim Worner and Fairfax boss Greg Hywood were busy explaining their commitment to content (or storytelling in Seven's case), Nine's owners were beavering away on preparations for a fourth-quarter float and fortifying their arsenal against arch rival Seven.
But the longer-term game is no longer about Murdoch versus Fairfax, or Seven versus Nine. They have a common digital enemy and their respective results make this abundantly clear. I'll get to that later.
Seven and Fairfax, as listed companies, had to spend much of their air time on Thursday explaining their productivity initiatives and defensive inroads into the cost of doing business.
Nine, which has been on a programming and station (Perth and Adelaide) shopping spree, occupies the luxurious space outside the glare of the market, for now.
But its former Nine lenders (come shareholders) are not the natural owners. This is now being tackled with an expedited float that gives them an opportunity to cash out.
The bottom line is that a new level of existential competition has emerged in media when their future is more exposed than ever.
The demerger of Rupert Murdoch's operations into separate print and entertainment divisions has focused the spotlight on the performance of its traditional newspaper organisations. The creation of the new News Corp will provide transparency never seen before.
Already the cracks have started to emerge, with the News Corp Australia chief, Kim Williams, taking his leave a few weeks ago following disagreements with editors about costs and content.
In a perfect world, media companies could stage a content-only battle but the game has moved on. For newspaper businesses, including those owned by Seven and Fairfax, the new competition from online digital classified operators such as Seek and Carsales continues to steal revenue. The challenges were laid bare as Seven West and Fairfax were forced to write down the value of their intangible assets whose returns no longer justify their carrying value. Seek, on the other hand, delivered strong earnings - hostage only to the economy, not structural forces.
Against this backdrop Nine has to convince would-be investors it can out-rate Seven (Ten is a tail-end Charlie in this contest) and do so without overpaying for ratings-generating programs.
At this point Seven has held its lead in ratings and advertising share but Nine has been picking up. For Seven West, the profit after tax of $225 million was a creditable result, as was full-year earnings before interest and tax of $422 million, despite the fact this was 11 per cent down on the previous year. After impairments, the full-year loss was $70 million.
Fairfax reported an 8.2 per cent fall in revenue for the year and a net loss after write-downs of $16.4 million but was rewarded with a share price lift.
So how does Nine mount a compelling case for a float when its rival is admitting to the challenges that confront the free-to-air television industry?
Nine needs to convince prospective investors that if the issue price is right, it can take the ascendancy on ratings and advertising share. But it takes time for ratings improvements to translate into advertising. Traditionally the ratings leader (in this case Seven) will punch above its weight in advertising share and the ratings laggard (Ten) will punch below its weight.
To date, despite Nine's ratings improvements, it has not done enough to deal with Seven's momentum.
Nine will need to market its offering in the expectation of a recovery in ratings and future earnings at a time when industry outcomes are challenged.
All the traditional media candidates, be they print or television, have to continue to get their balance sheets in pristine condition while presenting some prospect of an end game to revenue declines, to appeal to investors.
There is no backlog of Jeff Bezos-type investors (the Amazon founder who recently paid $US250 million for The Washington Post) prepared to fund content for the public/democratic good.
Seven West's ultimate controlling shareholder, Kerry Stokes, undoubtedly likes the power that media ownership provides, but he must have his eye on returns.
Murdoch will support his challenged print assets for as long as he retains power. Fairfax and those that take shares in Nine will need to fend for themselves.
Frequently Asked Questions about this Article…
Both Seven West Media and Fairfax Media reported bottom‑line losses but said their underlying earnings were slightly ahead of expectations. Seven West posted a profit after tax of $225 million and full‑year earnings before interest and tax of $422 million (down 11% on the prior year), but after impairments it recorded a full‑year loss of $70 million. Fairfax reported an 8.2% fall in revenue and a net loss after write‑downs of $16.4 million, yet its share price still lifted.
Media companies are writing down intangible assets because the future returns those assets were expected to generate no longer justify their carrying value. The article links these impairments to structural revenue pressure — in particular the loss of classified and other ad revenue to digital competitors — forcing newspapers and broadcasters to reassess asset values.
Online classified operators such as Seek and Carsales are taking classified advertising revenue away from traditional newspaper businesses. The article highlights that these digital platforms have siphoned a material and structural portion of classifieds revenue, contributing to weaker returns for print businesses and prompting write‑downs at companies like Seven and Fairfax.
Nine’s owners were preparing a fourth‑quarter float to give former lenders/shareholders an opportunity to cash out. For everyday investors the key points are: Nine must convince the market it can recover ratings and advertising share, the issue price needs to reflect that recovery potential, and ratings gains can take time to convert into meaningful advertising revenue and profits.
Ratings drive advertising share: the ratings leader (currently Seven) typically captures more than its proportional advertising revenue, while laggards (for example Ten) tend to underperform. However, the article notes that even if a network improves ratings, it can take time for those higher ratings to flow through into increased advertising earnings.
The demerger of News Corp into separate print and entertainment divisions is expected to create greater transparency around the performance of traditional newspaper assets. That scrutiny has already exposed tensions — the article notes News Corp Australia’s chief Kim Williams took leave amid disagreements about costs and content — and will make it easier for investors to assess print performance independently of broadcast or entertainment assets.
Investors should look for strong balance‑sheet health (manageable debt, liquidity) and clear plans to arrest revenue declines, such as credible productivity initiatives, disciplined cost management, and realistic growth prospects for digital revenues. The article stresses that traditional media companies need ‘pristine’ balance sheets and an identifiable path to stop revenue erosion to appeal to investors.
According to the article, the bigger long‑term threat is digital platforms — a ‘common digital enemy’ — rather than rival media groups. Online competition (notably digital classifieds and broader online advertising) is structurally changing revenue pools and is a key challenge confronting newspapers and free‑to‑air television.

