Italy's clowns are EU bellwether
Well, it's not looking good. Monti's party looks like coming fourth; not only is he running well behind the essentially comical Silvio Berlusconi, he's running behind an actual comedian, Beppe Grillo, whose lack of a coherent platform hasn't stopped him from becoming a powerful political force.
It's an extraordinary prospect, and one that has sparked much commentary about Italian political culture. But without trying to defend the politics of bunga bunga, let me ask the obvious question. What good, exactly, has what currently passes for mature realism done in Italy? For Monti was, in effect, the proconsul installed by Germany to enforce fiscal austerity on an already ailing economy; willingness to pursue austerity without limit is what defines respectability in European policy circles. This would be fine if austerity policies actually worked — but they don't. And far from seeming either mature or realistic, the advocates of austerity are sounding increasingly petulant and delusional.
Consider how things were supposed to be working at this point. When Europe began its infatuation with austerity, top officials dismissed concerns that slashing spending and raising taxes in depressed economies might deepen their depressions. On the contrary, they insisted, such policies would actually boost economies by inspiring confidence.
But the confidence fairy was a no-show. Nations imposing harsh austerity suffered deep economic downturns; the harsher the austerity, the deeper the downturn. Indeed, this relationship has been so strong the International Monetary Fund, in a striking mea culpa, admitted it had underestimated the damage austerity would inflict.
Meanwhile, austerity hasn't even achieved the minimal goal of reducing debt burdens. On the contrary, countries pursuing harsh austerity have seen the ratio of debt to GDP rise because the shrinkage in their economies has outpaced any reduction in the rate of borrowing. And because austerity policies haven't been offset by expansionary policies elsewhere, the European economy as a whole - which never had much of a recovery from the slump of 2008-09 - is back in recession, with unemployment marching ever higher.
The one piece of good news is that bond markets have calmed down, largely thanks to the stated willingness of the European Central Bank to step in and buy government debt when necessary. As a result, a financial meltdown that could have destroyed the euro has been avoided. But that's cold comfort to the millions of Europeans who have lost their jobs and see little prospect of ever getting them back.
Given all this, one might have expected some reconsideration and soul-searching on the part of European officials, some hints of flexibility. Instead, top officials have become even more insistent that austerity is the one true path.
Thus in January 2011, Olli Rehn, a vice-president of the European Commission, praised the austerity programs of Greece, Spain, and Portugal and predicted that the Greek program in particular would yield "lasting returns". Since then unemployment has soared in all three countries. But sure enough, in December 2012 Rehn published an article with the title Europe must stay the austerity course.
Oh, and Rehn's response to studies showing that the adverse effects of austerity are much bigger than expected was to send a letter to finance ministers and the IMF saying such studies were harmful because they threatened to erode confidence.
Italy, for all its dysfunction, has dutifully imposed austerity — and its economy has shrunk as a result.
Outside observers are terrified about Italy's election, and rightly so: even if the nightmare of a Berlusconi return to power fails to materialise, a strong showing by Berlusconi or Grillo would destabilise Italy. And Italy isn't unique: disreputable politicians are on the rise across southern Europe because respectable Europeans won't admit that the policies they have imposed on debtors are a disastrous failure. If that doesn't change, the Italian election will be just a foretaste of the dangerous radicalisation to come. NEW YORK TIMES
Frequently Asked Questions about this Article…
The article says Italy’s election is widely seen as a bellwether for the eurozone: a strong showing by disruptive figures like Silvio Berlusconi or Beppe Grillo could destabilise Italy and increase political risk across southern Europe, which in turn can unsettle European markets and investor confidence.
According to the article, Italy dutifully imposed austerity and its economy has shrunk as a result. For investors this matters because a contracting economy tends to reduce corporate profits, weaken consumer demand and raise political risk—factors that can hurt stocks and bonds.
The article explains officials believed spending cuts and higher taxes would inspire confidence and boost growth. In practice, that confidence didn’t materialise: countries imposing harsh austerity suffered deeper downturns, and even the IMF admitted it had underestimated the damage.
No. The article notes that austerity hasn’t achieved the goal of lowering debt burdens. In many countries the economy shrank faster than borrowing fell, so debt-to-GDP ratios actually rose.
The article says bond markets have calmed largely because the European Central Bank signalled it would buy government debt when necessary, helping avoid a financial meltdown that could have threatened the euro.
Rising unemployment—highlighted in the article—means weaker consumer spending and slower recoveries, and it has fuelled political anger. For investors, higher unemployment can translate into lower corporate revenues and greater political volatility, which increases market risk.
Yes. The article warns that the rise of disreputable or populist politicians in Italy is not unique and could foreshadow dangerous radicalisation across southern Europe if mainstream leaders continue to insist on austerity despite its economic harm.
Based on the article, investors should monitor Italian election results and other political developments, trends in unemployment and economic growth, changes in debt-to-GDP ratios, and bond-market conditions including any ECB intervention—because these factors drive market confidence and volatility.

