Looking beyond the lens: Atomos

Jeromy Young is the CEO and Founder of Atomos, which is a video hardware company. It started in 2009, and IPO’d last December at 41 cents a share. It's currently trading at around $1.25 dollars a share, so it’s obviously done well since the IPO. They raised $6 million in the IPO and another $7.5 million dollars just earlier this month at $1 dollar a share and the stock’s kept going up.

It’s quite a long interview; I went a bit over what I normally do because it’s so interesting. It’s quite technical but a really interesting business I think. It's definitely a global business – I spoke to Jeromy in Japan where he’s going around talking to his partners at Sony and Panasonic and so on. He’s created a very interesting business, and it currently has a market cap of around $200 million.

Morgans, the Brisbane stockbroker, which supported the placement, have got a target price of $1.63 on it, and that’s just been raised because Jeromy increased their revenue guidance for 2019 from $42 million in the prospectus to $50 million. Things are going very well and going better than they expected.

Here’s Jeromy Young, the CEO and Founder of Atomos.

Jeromy, you’ve just raised $7.5 million dollars at $1 dollar a share and that was on top of the IPO last year of $6 million. How much cash have you got in the back now?

If you include the $7.5m which actually was transacted just before the financial year completed, but didn’t execute until just after – to be honest, I’m not an accountant so I’m not sure how you treat that, but if you take the $7.5m then we had just over $5 million in the bank after the $6 million raise at the IPO, then the $7.5m kind of takes you up to that almost $13m mark.

And is the business cash positive now?

No, the answer is no, not consistently on average across the year. On average, we’re burning between $200-250k. Some months it’s positive, some months it’s more than that depending on when R&D projects come to fruition. As you might understand, some of them are pretty hefty when you’re doing silicone and the like, and they can come in pretty big chunks at certain times. Sometimes it’s a bit lumpy, the R&D spend, however in general it’s around $200-250k per month is the current burn rate. We’re balancing that with the growth rate at the same time, so there’s a lot of prediction and a lot of nuanced navigation between that growth rate of sales and the R&D spend.

To what extent is your burn rate under your control and a decision that you’re making?

Yeah, yeah, completely, it’s 100 per cent under our control. Apart from super growth, I’d say, apart from a pick up that was exceeding our expectation which we’ve had into our social market segment, our lower end sub-$500 line, the Shinobi line, and the Ninja-5 at US$695 has done extremely well in the pickup of social media area, and I’m sure we’ll talk a bit more about that later. That can take you a bit by surprise if it’s 25 per cent or 30 per cent up on your predictions, but other than that it’s completely under our control. The R&D spend is, we can push out those lumpy payments depending on whether we want it to come faster, or maybe growth is sustaining and we don’t need that tech for another 3 or 6 months and we can push it out.

Is your marketing expensive?

Not comparatively. We’re not a consumer company, although we’re playing the top-end of that consumer area. As we move down to the sub-$500 products and they end up in the JB Hi-Fi’s and the Harvey Norman’s which they are now, that becomes obviously a more cost intensive marketing exercise if you want to turn on the tap. We aren’t doing that at this point. We’ve got a good reputation in professional. The stores have been selling ours, especially the more professional top-end camera stores, like the Ted’s and the Camera Houses, etcetera, have been selling us in their flagship stores. We have more of a reputation around being a professional product and being used in real productions.

We haven’t had to turn on a massive marketing spend yet, so it’s definitely under control. Our strategy has been, get our products in front of people who are the captive professional video audience, and that is done at around five major trade shows around the world. One in America, one in Europe, one in Japan, one in China and then there’s a couple of photo shows at different times as well. We spend on those and we advertise at those places because it is a captive audience for our professional community. But as we move down, then you probably will see that marketing spend need to increase as we advertise on things like YouTube click-throughs where it can get quite expensive if people are clicking through, but that also means you’re driving sales. We aren’t in that category yet, but you probably will see us move to that over the next year or two.

Most of your cash outflow then is R&D – and we’ll get onto your products at a moment – but I take it that your ambition is to grow a number of products and I guess that’s where a lot of expense comes?

Yes, for sure. Well, our strategy, there’s two approaches in general to the silicone game, which is what we’re in. You can buy other people’s stuff that they’ve made and put them together and then add your value on top of it, which is a diminishing returns game because other people can just take those same components and ideas and once you put them in the market it’s kind of out there. Then they will be able to kind of nip at your heels. That was us for the first three or four years and that’s normal for a tech company starting up because you’ve got a new idea, a new market that you want to pursue, so taking advantage. Taking those off the shelf components and putting them together in an efficient way and working on things like manufacturing costs and awareness of the product, and things like that are the focus.

Around that three to four year mark, we realised as a business that we had a choice to make. We spend heavily and run away from our competition by controlling right down to the silicone level where we are not beholden to any other company, but that’s big spend. In our case it took $30 million over a four-year period and it produced what we’re calling the Ninja Platform, which is basically a system on chip design specifically for high-speed, high-quality video processing. If you imagine a computer, but built specifically for video and it doesn’t need to open word documents, it doesn’t need to browse the internet, and the bandwidth through that silicone is extremely wide and allows us to maintain quality and also gives us the ability to manipulate that video for creative effect or for engineering analysis which is what our customers want to do with it.

So we went and spent this $30 million on a platform and then we spent approximately $10m on the man-power to make an operating system that flew on top of that silicone. Now we’ve got basically the hardware and the silicone is in our control with all the functions that we want in there and what that gives us is a 10 to 1 power advantage over those off the shelf company offerings, and it gives us around 20 times functionality improvement, which means we can turn on more and more functions in software, similar to your phones and your computers, as they do. And so we’ve taken that kind of back to basics tech approach where we need to control every part, every piece of silicone is ours, every board design in electronic is ours, every line of code in our software is ours and then we licence in standards like HDMI and Apple standards like ProRes format that we’re famous for, and then we enable that inside that ecosystem.

So, yes, the R&D is heavy but we’ve gone through that spend and the spend on maintaining our lead in product, which is what your question was I believe, is directly related to our ability to turn on those software features while we’ve got the platform underlying it. We do not have to spend $30 million on the next gen, it’s an incremental $1 to $2 million on top for the next generation.

Let me just get this straight, you started the company in 2009 and you got your first Apple ProRes format approval in 2010?

Yes.

So you’re saying in those days you were basically distributing other people’s silicone and it wasn’t until sort three or four years after that that you built your own?

Yeah, that’s correct. Alan, this is a broad definition for – without sounding condescending – a non-engineering kind of audience. There’s three types of processors. There’s CPUs which have a fixed function but you can do a lot of little things with them, file, click, open this, do that, perfect for a desktop computer or a laptop, and that’s Intel and they spend big dollars on their silicone, but that’s really fast, right? Three billion times a second, 3 gigahertz, it goes around and does these functions and then you tell it what to do. It’s not very good at fixed function that isn’t standard, things like video codecs and network latency reductions and things like this are all done in what they call ‘programmable chips’ and they are slower but more flexible, you can tell them to do anything.

They’re the ones that we use and most companies under our size or around our size are using, and that’s what I mean when I say programmable chip from someone else. It’s still our code running on it, but it’s something that someone else can buy and use the same part, it’s not exclusive and it’s got some limitations. What we did was we combined what Intel are doing plus these custom chips and you put them all together in one mini-chip and you laser cut it down to really, really small size, which gives you low power but you keep the function. That’s what we went and did. Just to give you an idea, the A-series chip from Apple in the phones, A1, A2 – I think they’re up to A14 or something now and they’re in the iPads as well. That’s what Apple did when they did the phone, they combined everything together and made a phone computer, basically, and then they released the iPhone.

What we’ve done is we took that step but we made a video computer and we went away from these off the shelf chips that anyone can program – it’s still exclusive programming but it’s limited, and so therefore we levelled up our functionality by making our own and also we can put our secret sauce that no one knows is in there and we can unleash it over periods of time to keep our competitive lead or give the customer more amazing functionality.

That $40 million, that’s quite a big raise for a small company to be starting up in Australia…

Yes!

Who gave you that money?

I’ll get into that in a second, but I think one step before that, in 2015 we were a $30 million dollar or $27.5 million dollar business and we had $5.7 million EBITDA. That was using those off the shelf chips, our Ninja revolutionary product for video production using Apple’s Hollywood format as the kind of stake in the sand, high quality recording from any camera, and that worked really well and we had a booming business. But we knew that if we didn’t invest in the future then we would be gobbled up or our lead would be less and our growth would reduce and our profit would reduce and it’d be all the wrong direction…

Can I just take you back a bit further?

Yes?

When you started the business, what were you doing before that and what was the gap or the opportunity that you identified?

My original foray into video – I moved to Japan after a BHP cadetship in Wollongong, out of high school, you know the university program that they put on? Great program, huge learning from all angles, life, university, work, the whole lot, and I did a project with Nippon Steel in Wollongong and went over to Japan for six months – didn’t like it in the job but I stayed for a year doing the old teach English, make some money, have a year off. When I was doing that I taught the President of a DV video capture-board company, computer-based that made capture-boards for computers to capture your mum and dad DV videos, back in the day, 2000, when digital video with tape was very popular. And capturing that into a computer was a big endeavour and this company was leading that.

I was teaching the President of that company and he asked me to come work for him and that’s when I took a job in Japan capturing from Sony, Panasonic, Canon, Nikon cameras into the computer. The opportunity I saw was to take that capture-card and put it on top of a camera, low power, battery operated, and give the capture-card of the computer in the hands of the creative onset. What that allows them to do is just preserve really high quality and not have to cut the quality to a small memory card inside the camera, and it allowed them to produce a Hollywood quality, and that meant that the creativity was the winner, not the amount of money in your pocket to get that quality like a cinema type of production would be.

How did a BHP cadet go about doing that?

I learnt from an amazing group of companies – Sony, Canon, Pana, I learnt the language here – I’m actually in Japan right now, visiting these companies on the next generation of products, which is very exciting. This is what we do, I come here every three months, minimum, and we have these meetings on what we should do next. I call it the Armada of ProRes companies that we’re teaming up together to give this solution to customers. They’re very passionate about it. They have managers and – my heroes are Akio Morita-san, the Founder of Sony; Matsushita-san, the Founder of Panasonic; and obviously Steve Jobs in the later times has been an amazing businessman and tech leader. Learning from the companies that they built, the people inside those companies, they have the knowledge and I love learning and have kind of an insatiable appetite for that, so I’m always asking questions.

As a 23-year-old in Japan in my first job – I was here for seven years working in that job – I asked a billion questions and they gave me world-leading answers and I worked out after travelling the world, selling the products that I made within that organisation, that there are certain methods that the Japanese have in both tech and business in general that allow them to go deep and wide into markets all over the world and they have a method to do that. They taught me sales, distribution, they taught me how to make products, how to manage the manufacturing process, how to manage the engineering teams, how to manage the financial… The company I was in went public at the time so it was a big learning experience for all the workers there as you know when that happens and that stood us in good stead when we went public. Just to finish, after I left that I then came to a video company in Australia called Black Magic Design. I was there for two and a half years and I ran their global sales operation and built their distribution channel, input a little bit into the product development but mainly it was sales, grew their business significantly, a great learning time for me, and the CTO and I at Black Magic Design, we had some different ideas to what the CEO there had and we wanted to go start our own business, so we did that.

The CTO was Ian Overliese, was it?

That’s correct, yes.

And he doesn’t seem to be involved in your business anymore, is that right?

No, that’s right. As we were growing and we took on the big investment into the chip development – he’s an amazing engineer and a real engineering talent that I’ve benefitted from working with him on both a personal and a professional level and there was a time about a year and a half ago where the business needed to choose what it wanted to do. The board and I were very vocal about taking it public and the growth path and he just wasn’t in that frame of mind. So, we managed a nice exit for him, he’s a supportive shareholder. He sold down a significant portion of his shareholding but he still remains in some form of the business and he’s a big supporter of Atomos.

So, you’ve got to tell us where you got the $40 million from?

The $40 million came from – when you do these R&D projects, and I was not as experienced a CEO at that point, four years ago, and some of the R&D management that you’re doing now, your very question on cash burn, etcetera, at the beginning of this interview, was where we made some big mistakes. We had like million-dollar lumps hit us at a time when we had big growth, working capital requirements for product delivery. No one who’s probably listening to your podcast will misunderstand the challenges that that brought. We had financial management to a reasonable level but it wasn’t really architected CFO stuff, Alan, if you know what I mean. The management in that area was a little bit lacking.

Well, we’ve become conscious lately of the ‘valley of death’ which I think you’ve got through.

Yes, correct! Which we’re very proud to get through. I don’t know whether we can analyse exactly what caused that but our theory is that if you incrementally – very Japanese style, continuous improvement – if you incrementally improve every bit of your business every day, then you’re going to be better than if you didn’t, so that’s our endeavour. Where the money came from, I approached – or the business approached, but I found, a company called Henslow. Henslow is a boutique capital raising and broker and corporate advisory firm. They do a lot of different things, they’ve got a lot of talent inside their organisation that has been in corporates and in finance and in public companies previously.

The concept is, Henslow was the name of the support act for Darwin when he was making his theories on evolution, etcetera, and really, a lot is attributed to the support that this Henslow guy gave Darwin. He kind of wrote everything down and he was his assistant. The founders of Henslow – actually, one of the founders is the Chairman of Atomos now, he came in four years ago to assess why we were running out of money and what we could do about it. He saw the metrics of the business and he goes, “Wow, you’re big on this R&D stuff, you probably should cover that, otherwise you’re going to lose your business.”

So, we architected a convertible note after he came in for nine months to help tidy up the finances and give us that CFO view – he was a former CFO himself. He came in and gave that advice and it was an amazing experience for me to learn from someone of that calibre and we guided through a $6 million dollar raise, then a $10 million dollar raise for the second phase of the development to be completed. Then we did a $7 million pre-IPO raise and of course we put all of our profits for the last four to five years into it, when you add all that up it gets to about $40 million of spend. Where did that come from? Wealthy individual Australians or family money that met me, met the people inside the business, and said, ‘You know what, I think these Aussies have got something.’

Even though I was trained in Japan, I’m definitely one that goes over the water if I think the odds are in my favour. We definitely project that in the world but we want to win and we want to do it in a very Australian way, we want to dominate and we want to do it fairly. These guys bought into that, they’ve come along from the journey from four years ago. I can definitely tell you that the convertible note conditions, after IPO and the growth that we’ve experienced, they’re very happy shareholders and you would have seen that when the escrow came off that we didn’t have to cover the entire amount, only around 27 per cent of it wanted to get a return once the escrow came off after six months.

I think that indicates the level of support of $60-million-odd of shares that weren’t sold at that time because they believe in the growth of our business and in the team that’s driving it.

That company – what’s its name? The company that sold everything out of escrow, I can’t remember the name now…

Imagination.

Imagination, that’s right. I presume they made a fair bit of money but they’ve got out early haven’t they?

Well, it’s not early for them. They were the original chip partner. They’re an interesting company, I’ll just briefly mention them. Ian Overliese, the Co-Founder, worked for this company, it’s called Imagination Technologies, and he was one of the architects of the graphics process of it, he’s responsible for the pinch and zoom on the iPhone and the whole wonderful graphics that Apple have, that was licenced in from this company called Imagination Technologies and Ian was part of that original team that built that engine, and then it ended up in the iPhone. That company then took that IP because Apple were kind of bringing everything in-house, and you’ll see that they were de-listed and a bit of a disaster happened over the same period we were making the chip with them.

Their company’s evolved substantially over the period that we did business with them. We finished the chip together, it wasn’t an easy ride because they were focused on other things, but you will see that the former CEO, when all of this went down a few years ago in Imagination, he left Imagination and he’s a non-exec director on our board because he wanted to see the chip come to fruition and all the investment that we put in not go to waste. Imagination have been there for four and a half years, they took some equity and cash to do the chip development together and after five years they were bought by a China private equity firm and they’re happy to get a 120 per cent return on their original investment over the five years. They’re not strategic anymore.

I take it that the Apple ProRes authorisation that was quite early on, 2010, was really important, and I also take it you’ve retained that having created your own chip?

Yes.

But also, there was a ProRes RAW authorisation from Apple. When I look on the Apple website there’s a very large number of ProRes authorisations, so that’s obviously very competitive, but there’s only five with a ProRes RAW authorisation including Atomos. Was that made possible by your own chip and is that where most of your value lies, in that authorisation?

Very good question. I’m going to frame it that the ProRes ecosystem, whether it be RAW or standard video – and the RAW just means that you haven’t made decisions yet on turning it into an image, so all the values are there to create an image but you haven’t made the decisions. Traditionally the cameras make those decisions for you which is why Sony looks a certain way or Canon looks a certain way. What has happened in video is the same as happened in photo. We used to edit JPEGs and take them and put them in a computer. Now we take RAW, Canon RAW or Sony RAW or whatever RAW and then photoshop does the processing. And the reason that’s important is you can be more creative if you control the processing to the image from the silicone values of what can be made into an image but it hasn’t been processed yet.

When you look at the ProRes ecosystem of high-quality video recording, the 300 or something that you see as ProRes licensees, most of those, around 290 of them, are software licences, so that means they have access to the format inside a Mac or inside a Windows computer, so that’s a software licence. The hardware licence to do it in a separate product like ours is very limited because Apple have to trust that you can match the quality they achieve in their computer, in a separate device outside of their computer. Then they have to match the quality of those two formats, one that’s on the computer and one that’s separately recorded on a separate device, actually are of the same calibre. But that is very difficult to do because computers have different capability, as I described, than external devices. We are experts at taking Apple’s high quality software codecs and putting them into hardware.

Which is why when they wanted to do a RAW next generation of this ProRes format which is, now computers are able to process the RAW, not just the video, so it can do more processing, that’s all that means, they came to us and said, “Could you put that RAW into an external device so that we can enable these cameras?” At the same time, the Japanese camera makers were giving me out of video cameras, RAW data, because they’re going, “We can do this now Jeromy, we should give it to you.” Because, Alan, the key point is we sit between the imaging world and the computer world and we record to computer formats, not imaging formats, not camera formats, that’s the big difference and that’s why we have a solid business.

But in general, those five licensees, two of them are hardware licences, DJI and Atomos, we were the first and DJI was the second. All the other licences that you see on there are software companies, so they are licenced to take our files that were recorded and then process them inside a Mac for some reason, right? Transcode it or send it to YouTube or whatever.

What I’m really trying to get to is, what the competitive situation is in your business and the extent to which you will have pricing power – and also, a lot of these games are winner takes all and so on, but I’m just wondering whether that’s even remotely likely to occur in your business?

I think the difference between traditional electronic business and let’s say, computer/IT business, the computer world, is the computer world is all about standards and openness and collective improvement on workflow and problems and problem solving. The electronic world is more of a keep it to yourself. If I mentioned Sony and Canon, they’re kind of closed companies, they don’t really open up a lot to outside world. Apple’s kind of halfway between, and if you look at a Microsoft which is the traditional kind of open computer software model, they’re giving it to everyone and everyone can develop on it. Apple, it’s a bit more selective. The Japanese electronic companies are very closed. What we are, we kind of span those. We’re closed in the fact that Sony and Canon have chosen us or I’ve built a reputation and my team have built a confidence level and trust level with them that they choose to open up to us. It’s not open to everyone and it’s a very select group, so that is a competitive advantage, Alan, and at the same time we truly enjoy working with them, they truly are partners and friends. I’ve got meetings – today is JVC, Nikon, yesterday was Sony and Olympus, Panasonic’s tomorrow – these are the who’s who of this area and they’re opening up to us and us alone, and we’re saying, ‘We will help you get your products into the hands of people who want to use computer formats.’ And it’s working, they’re seeing increase, we are.

When you go over to the open computer side, we need our formats to be open and Atomos is the only company that’s saying we want to record from any camera and we want to give it to any software on the computer, we just want to sit in the middle. What other competitors are doing – every camera maker has their own RAW format and if you want to use that format you have to follow their bespoke closed path through the computer, usually using their software or a specific workflow that they’ve defined for you. What we offer is we don’t care where you want to go, you want to go Adobe software, you can do it. You want to go Apple software, you can do it. You want to go Microsoft software, you can do it. Google’s thinking about coming into that, they’re probably going to do all right, they’ll be able to use it as well.

We sit in the middle connecting the imaging world to the computer world with open standards, and Apple are the best at open video standards. There’s many RAW formats in the world, Alan, and people go, ‘So, why is yours different?’ Ours is different because we can capture from a Sony, from a Canon, from any camera that wants to work with us and every other RAW format is closed to that manufacturer only and then you don’t have the software choices, which is very un-computer-like, right? You should be able to go into any software you choose, that’s the whole point of the race of the tech idea game in software and hardware. So, we feel very comfortable that we have competitive advantage with the relationships and closed competitive advantage with the Sony’s and the Panasonic’s.

Then on the Apple and computer side, we are also enabling in the way that they’re used to that fosters more sales and more customers and better solutions for customers, and so they’re super-happy. We’re very comfortable with where we sit, we don’t want to make cameras and we don’t want to make software because that will kill the business model that we truly believe in.

What sort of margin do you make, and is that margin expanding or shrinking?

We don’t get out of bed for anything less than 50 per cent GP in general, and the only reason we go under 50 per cent is usually end of life – it’s usually a two to three year cycle for the product, so by the time you get to the second year you might have some competitors trying to come in or your new product needs to be priced a little bit more attractive to win more market share. So, we would put some price pressure and maybe end up, at a minimum, around a 45 per cent gross margin and that’s a very hardware driven model, where we get recurring revenue on top of that. So, in answer to your first question, those margins go north of 50 per cent as we gain momentum and move into different types of markets.

The entertainment market is a bit of a higher profit but more complex products. Our pro-video market is probably about that, 50 per cent GP is the right number to keep market share and competitors at bay. In the social, you might need to go down to more like 45 per cent. If you look at Apple, they’re at about 31 per cent for their phones’ GP. We’re on a hardware level – I mean, we’re not consumer level, so they obviously have a lot more volume, but we would be very comfortable with a consumer play at around the 50 per cent. It might dip but we’re pushing our new products and our new offerings north of 50 per cent, and that’s the hardware play, right? And a lot of people go, ‘Are you a hardware or a software company?’ and really, they’re asking, ‘Am I limited to this 50 per cent GP or can you leverage that for more growth?’

You’ve recently upgraded your 2019 financial year guidance from $42 million in the Prospectus, to $50 million revenue. Is that due to margin or volume?

Volume, that’s due to volume.

What happened that surprised you?

Two things – the team performed exceptionally well on our sub-$500 dollar product line called the Shinobi. And then its bigger brother, the Ninja, which is our traditional pro-video space, we’re promoting it to the high-end social influencer who have a similar metric to a professional kind of wedding guy, but using the same kit, Alan. It’s really interesting what’s happening now. They’re all doing the same things that we’re used to, but they’re doing it without the knowledge of a pro-video education. They’re just coming in from anywhere, you know, and saying, I want to make this and give me some kit. It’s really exciting, the growth in that market, but that market took us by surprise.

Two things, the engineers delivered a month early, so February was our release date when we planned for March, so there’s an extra month of sales, so that’s great, but that was the team’s effort. Then the second part is the pickup of that product exceeded expectations by about 250-300 per cent. For example, if I’m estimating 5,000 a quarter, I did 20,000, and that’s what caught us by surprise, Alan.

Does that indicate your addressable market is bigger than you thought, particularly when you’re starting to talk about the sub-$500 products to what you call the social media influencers? Has suddenly the market opened up a bit more than you expected?

It really has, the last two to three years. It did exactly that, it’s not anything else. The markets opened up, these people are buying, they’re getting click-through revenue, which means they have an income, which means they’re a professional now, which means they can spend that money on professional equipment, and where we have a reputation for that so we’re right in the firing line, provided we can show them the product and how they can use it, which we are doing and we’re well-known for, then we are picking up those customers. As that growth happens it also opens up the ability to market to this new generation of story-tellers that are coming through. Probably the most exciting thing for me is they’re also coming up with new ideas on the way they want to work, so it really is driving innovation in our business.

Is your protection long-term due to brand or relationships or patents?

Brand and relationships, those two. Patents, no, everything is secret for us, we aren’t patenting how we do it. A lot of it is just clever combinations of – you know how you get somebody who’s really good at their job and then you watch how they do it and they start correctly, they setup the second step, setup the third step, setup the fourth step, and by the time they get to the 10^th step you’re like, ‘Wow, look at where we are!’ and it’s that progression that will keep our – the partnerships are getting stronger so that stranglehold is getting stronger and at the same time, the knowhow of piecing the partnerships with the tech inside one product all together and solving workflow components that used to be separate and combining them, which is what people want, they want an easier life but still achieve the same thing, and that focus allows us to keep our competitive advantage. It’s about the partnerships and the knowhow, it’s not about patents. If I show people what we’re doing then they can copy it. It’s like Coca-Cola’s secret, let’s keep it secret, it’s inside our chip and no one’s going to know about it except our team and therefore we can keep our competitive advantage.

I’m going to have to leave it there, Jeromy, it’s been really good talking to you.

Thanks, Alan, appreciate your time.

That was Jeromy Young, the CEO and Founder of Atomos.